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# STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

# THE CIVIL-MILITARY THING: HOW DOES A SOLDIER GET IT RIGHT?

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEPHEN M. SITTNICK United States Army

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# This Civil-Military Thing: How does a soldier get it right?

by

LTC Stephen M. Sittnick U.S. Army

Doctor Martin Cook Project Advisor

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#### ABSTRACT

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The subject of civil-military relations is worthy of study by military and civilian leaders. Many individuals have attacked the current state of U.S. civil-military relations. Due to the foundational nature of civilian supremacy over the military in our American brand of democracy, these criticisms have ignited a spirited debate. It can be argued that the military leader can gain some useful knowledge of the character of balanced civil-military relations by focusing on the debate. However, instead of choosing which 'camp' he should join, it would be better for the soldier to build a theoretical base that gets at the central question, "How do we build and maintain a healthy, balanced civil-military relationship?" The purposes of this paper are to address the current challenges to civil-military relations and propose a soldier's model for the maintenance of a healthy civil-military relationship.

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# THIS CIVIL-MILITARY THING: HOW DOES A SOLDIER GET IT RIGHT?

On the threshold of the Twentieth-first century the U.S. military has been focusing on change. Doctrine, training, hardware, organizational structure and the way we lead and develop service members have all been the subject of much thought and experimentation. The goal is to allow the Armed Forces to continue meeting the demands of a challenging environment well into the future. The purpose of this paper is to examine an element of that environment - - the relationship with the civilian sector of American society. Current civilmilitary relations have been the target of much criticism from academicians, press, civilian leaders and military members. Charges of a degenerating relationship have caused some to claim the situation is at a crisis state for such reasons as divergent civilian and military value systems and lack of sufficient civilian control over the military. In his book Making the Corps, Thomas E. Ricks describes the disgust that U.S. Marine trainees have with the pathetic and disgusting state of civilian society Professor Richard H. Kohn, in an article appearing in The National Interest, appealed to American civilian leadership to regain control of an out of control military2. Charles J. Dunlap dramatically described the dramatic price of an

unbalanced civil-military relationship in his fictional account of an American Military coup in the year 2012<sup>3</sup>. This paper will consider these criticisms, as it examines why civil-military relationship is an issue worthy of study, what challenges exist to maintaining a healthy civil-military relationship, and what theoretical models can help us maintain good civil-military relations.

#### SECTION ONE- WHY STUDY CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Judging by the volume of commentary on the current state of civil-military relations in the United States, it seems clear that the subject warrants close study. Some writers argue that the military has deliberately exceeded the bounds of civilian control, while others say the civilian leadership is unwilling or unable to exercise sufficient control. Failure of the military to recruit and retain members has been blamed on a decrepit state of societal values that has poisoned the well of prospective soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. Some experts attribute these conditions to normal tensions between U.S. civilian and military leadership. What is missing, though, is a description of exactly what constitutes a healthy civil-military relationship. Also lacking is an institutional model or set of quidelines for civilian and military leaders to refer to in

order to maintain a healthy relationship. It is important to apply the same intellect and scholarship to the study of civil-military relations as we have to other issues that challenge us. I will approach the subject by considering the following issues: the Constitutional and historical support for the study of civil-military relations, the impact of a strategy of Global Engagement on civil-military relations, and the implications of Military Support to Civilian Agencies for future civil-military relations.

Civilian supremacy over the military is fundamental to our constitutional government. The soldier's oath states that he will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies - - foreign and domestic. The pledge of one's life to defend the ideals enumerated in a document certainly qualifies as sufficient justification for study of those ideals. The Constitution provides for our professional military force and the civilian arms of state to control it.

One could argue that the Constitution is the capstone document of American civil-military relations. As such it appeals to the reader to study the associated theory, doctrine and history to insure compliance with its principles. The military professional must apply intellect and scholarship, as well as patriotic faith, to the concept of civil-military relations.

Concomitantly, civilian leaders as the supreme party in this

duality must devote energy to the study of civil-military relations.

Many of our founding fathers were reluctant to authorize a standing military. Indeed both Madison and Hamilton had to argue in the Federalist papers that it was both necessary and possible for a constitutional government to raise and control a standing army<sup>4</sup>. They believed that there was no alternative if the nation was to maintain the liberty bought with the blood of American patriots. Civilian supremacy over the military was a necessary prerequisite to the constitutional provision for a standing army. Today, this same civil supremacy is assumed unquestioningly by most American citizens in and out of uniform.

The basic assumption of civilian supremacy and other beliefs derived from underlying premises of American liberalism are the average citizen's basis for understanding the U.S. Civil-military relations. Professor Samuel Huntington, in his seminal work <a href="#">The Soldier and the State</a>, declares that military and civilian leaders who decide on issues of national security can not rely upon this assumption alone. They must develop a credible theory of civil-military relations <sup>5</sup>. His academic admonition is to study civil-military relations to insure unity of effort between civil and military leaders in developing credible foreign policy in the interest of national security.

Professor Huntington believes that determining the proper pattern of civil-military relations that will best maintain the security of the American nation is a functional imperative  $^6$ .

In addition to the constitutional and historical reasons for studying civil-military relations there is the stark reality of our current 'dangerous peacetime environment'. The current National Security Strategy (NSS) identifies global engagement as the imperative of our nation's strategic approach. leadership and engagement in the world is vital for our own security and for insuring a safe world. The NSS further directs us to be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to achieve our security objectives. U.S. military power has been deemed an appropriate instrument frequently in the past decade. In addition to an overseas presence, our military has conducted numerous combat operations and peacetime engagement activities. The NSS even identifies a separate category of military operations, Smaller Scale Contingencies (SSC), that includes humanitarian assistance, peace operations, treaty/embargo enforcement, limited strikes and intervention. The NSS includes a caveat that SSCs will require significant and frequent commitments from U.S. military forces. 8 Our civilian leadership has put the U.S. military on alert. In light of this charter for frequent engagement, both

military and civilian leaders had better understand this new dynamic of civil-military relations which will frequently require leaders to decide for or against the use of military force.

The NSS declares that our armed forces will be serving as a role model for militaries in emerging democracies. It cites our 200-year history of civilian control as our credentials to serve as example setters for other countries struggling to build a military that support their efforts to mold a fledgling democracy. Partnership for Peace (PFP) exercises have brought U.S. military units and the forces of emerging democracies into close contact. Clearly observation of U.S. military members in day to day duties will have a vicarious benefit to other militaries, but what manual or lesson plan can an American soldier refer to in order to present a block of formal instruction on the principles of civil control or civil-military relations? There are published tasks, conditions and standards for many tactical skills. There are even lesson plans for procedures dealing with civilian non-combatants and the press on the battlefield. Where is the reference document that describes how military leaders are to interact with civilian leadership? It seems we not only have to study civil-military relations for our own sake but that of other nations' armed forces as well.

The stakes of civil-military relations on the home front have risen in recent years. The 1997 NSS warned that threats of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), drug trafficking and disaster relief in the United States or abroad may require the use of military forces<sup>10</sup>. A host of new plans and accompanying terminology were developed by the military to satisfy the requirements articulated in multiple acts of legislation and Presidential Planning Directives. Military Support to Civilian Authorities (MSCA) is the assigned heading for these new missions. The military was not only directed to augment the efforts of civilian agencies but, in the case of WMD response, it was directed to train U.S. civilian response agencies in WMD consequence management. This marked a new chapter in civil-military relations where the military would come in frequent contact with civilian agencies.

Charles J. Dunlap warns of the inherent danger in overtasking the military for non-war fighting missions in his account of a fictional U.S. Military coup<sup>II</sup>. Although a hyperbole, it dramatically poses the question: what is too much to ask of the military to help at home? How will we recognize it when even though the military's inherent efficiency and readiness would incline us to task them, prudence would require we call on a civilian agency? All parties are breaking ground

on the limits of normative civil-military relations - a clarion call to devote time to the study of this area.

These justifications clearly demonstrate the need to examine the subject of civil-military relations. Our ultimate quest is to determine how we can maintain a healthy civil-military relationship. To that end, section two of this paper will deal with the question: What are the obstacles to a healthy civil-military relationship? Section three will confront the question: How can we get and keep the relationship healthy?

# SECTION TWO- WHAT CAN MAKE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS GO BAD?

It is helpful to identify the challenges to maintaining a healthy civil-military relationship. I will examine four areas that currently challenge civil-military relations:

- a. Operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of Global Engagement
- b. Differences in Civilian and Military Strategic Decisionmaking
- c. Politicization of the Military Officer Corps (crisis or myth)
- d. Value Gap between the Civilian and Military Society

# OPTEMPO, or "Look where they're sending us now"

"Only a fellow soldier can appreciate the difficult position that politicians place us in."

An anonymous International Fellow Student at U.S. Army War College, speaking of the challenges he had encountered on his country's Peacekeeping Operations

It is understood that a soldier will face hardship and danger in war and contingency combat operations. He will also, on occasion, face moments of danger and hardship in deployments other than war. These operations have even claimed the lives of American military members. Though operations such as peacekeeping and relief operations are a recognized component of

our National Strategy, the American military today faces an unprecedented number of these deployments. At this writing the U.S. military has over one hundred and five thousand troops, excluding those already stationed overseas, deployed and engaged throughout the globe in such operations.

The character of these operations in recent years has taken on a particularly macabre dimension. The U.S. military has been immersed into environments of ethnic cleansing of the Balkans, clan fighting in Somalia, terrorism in Lebanon and genocide and disease in Rwanda. The realities of these environments significantly challenge our soldiers who have been reared in a society that values individual freedom and the dignity of human life. Exposure to such challenges as Somali clan-fighting, Balkan ethnic cleansing, the deprivation of the Kurds during Operation Provide Comfort and suffering of Rwandans has a potentially significant impact on civil-military relations. The challenge increases when policy fails, and objectives are not achieved. Furthermore, if American lives are left in the wake then the American public can be extremely critical of both its civil and military leaders.

Civilian leaders must consider the potential impact on civil-military relations when planning for military deployments. The fifth point of the famous Weinberger Doctrine required that there be reasonable assurance that the deployment of military

forces will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. This point is emphasized by Colonel Harry Summers in his book, The New World Strategy. He believes that U.S. military foreign policy is founded on a clear understanding of the unique relationship between the American military and the American people. He furthers quotes former Army Chief of Staff General Fred C. Weyand as saying, "The American Army really is a people's army in the sense that it belongs to the American people who take a jealous and proprietary interest in its involvement. The Army, therefore, cannot be committed lightly 12. Furthermore, civilian leaders must not assume total success when asking whether we have public support. They must also consider whether they can maintain public support when things go badly as they did when the Marine Barracks were bombed in Lebanon or when the bodies of U.S. servicemen were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Can the vision of the political End State endure the reality on the ground? Has sufficient military force been deployed to handle the situation when things do not go as planned? Will the objectives stamped out on the "Why are we here" cards carried by deployed service members stand up to the scrutiny of an American public watching the vivid real-time reporting on CNN in their living rooms?

An often-quoted phrase is that every man's cup has a limit when faced with stress and hardship. Civilian leaders must be sensitive to the capacity of the military's cup in light of frequent overseas deployments to challenging environments and missions. Risk assessment must include concern for civilmilitary relations. Professor Cochran pointed out in his book on civil-military relations that the military failure in Vietnam resulted in public disillusionment and alienation 13. In the same book, Elmer J. Mahoney reminds us that, "Vietnam was in no sense an aberration of the military but a product of civilian policy contoured by three successive Presidents, aided mainly by civilian intellectuals drafted into public service"14. Civilian leaders may construct political objectives but they are handed over to military leaders for the conduct of military operations. It is the heritage of this country that leaders both in and out of uniform will eventually feel the impact of military failure.

### Strategic Decision making

"The soldier is the statesman's junior partner".

General Matthew B. Ridgway, post-Korean War Chief of Staff of the Army

This quote is constitutional fact. In almost every aspect of life the military answers to some civilian leader. The President commands the military, the Congress insures it is manned, equipped and funded, and the service secretaries insure compliance with policy and effective administrative management. The extent of control is not limited to the present state of the services. As articulated in the National Security Strategy, "the Administration, in partnership with the Congress, will continue to assure we maintain the best trained, best-equipped and best led military force in the world for the 21st Century. We will continue looking across our government to see if during this time of transition we are adequately preparing to meet the national security challenges of the next century" 15.

Some believe this is a distinct challenge to our civilian leaders because many have never served in the military.

However, as daunting as the task may be today, consider how our founding fathers must have felt when they had to create our military. The small percentage of military veterans in the first Continental Congress was not an insurmountable obstacle,

nor should it be considered one today. Civilian leaders must understand the general principles concerning the use of military force as an instrument of policy as they decide on the future state of our military. The presence of military veterans in the halls of Congress or Oval Office undoubtedly has a positive effect on the maintenance of healthy civil-military relations. We have not reached so low a number, however, as to merit any alarm for a lack appreciation of military service or inability to formulate credible national security policy.

There is concern in some circles that current civilian leadership is neither interested nor confident in dealing with defense issues. Thomas Ricks explains it is not an issue of ideology but that post-cold war reduction in military budgets has made defense issues very unpleasant 16. No member of Congress wants to have their name associated with a measure that closes a base or halts a defense contract in their district. Some, such as Charles Moskos, believe that American elites just do not understand the military 17. Vignettes such as the slight delivered to General McCaffrey by a White House staffer and former Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs Mrs. Sara Lister's characterization of the Marine Corps as a group of extremists reveal a lack of appreciation for American military professionalism. It can be a chore, perhaps even a burden, to be in control of the Armed Forces. However,

the Constitution of the United States dictates that in matters from command to administration a civilian will direct the U.S. military. If control is the task, then an appropriate amount of study, understanding and compassion must accompany the assumption of the position. As Thomas Hobbes put it, "the fundamental law of nature is to seek peace and ensure it" 18. In the United States the civilian leadership takes the lead for the military in maintaining the peace and security of our nation. It is the primary responsibility to the governed.

Ironically at times the civilian leadership has been too involved in the tactical and operational affairs of combat and not focusing on strategic issues of national defense. Professor Cochran points out that, despite conventional wisdom, abuse of military force in American history has resulted more frequently from military decisions made by civilians than by those made by the military. Direction of individual bombing targets from the Oval Office while our National Strategy in Vietnam was rotting is a painful example of misdirected focus. Similarly the mission creep that allowed the American military to transition from humanitarian assistance to apprehension of a Somali warlord is evidence of how our strategic leaders can get mired in things tactical and lose sight of strategic objectives. The priority for civilian leaders is to develop a coherent and viable set of

strategic objectives that guide military leaders in developing appropriate campaign plans.

Likewise, any escalation or reduction of mission parameters requires attention to condition setting. The civilian leader has to insure that political objectives are within the realistic limits of what the military can achieve prior to issuing a mission change. Statesmen must wargame the outcomes, applying any restraints and constraints they are considering for military operations. As Admiral Eccles advises civilian leaders, "limitations that are to be imposed on the military professional commanding the forces in combat are vital factors in the effectiveness of the forces used."

On the other hand, Professor Huntington reminds the military leader, his function is to warn the statesman when the purposes are beyond his means<sup>21</sup>. A more contemporary admonition can be found in the "Somalia: Lessons Learned" document: "One major responsibility in a peace operation is determining and measuring success - keeping the chain of command informed as to where we are between entry and exit while avoiding the inevitable pressures of mission creep"<sup>22</sup>. This chain of command must include the civilian leaders responsible for crafting the political objectives.

## Politicization of the Officer Corps

"In the United States, we go to considerable trouble to keep soldiers out of politics, and even more to keep politics out of soldiers."

Brigadier General S.B. Griffith II, U.S.M.C.: Introduction to Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare 23.

The officer corps of the military has been accused recently of becoming increasingly politicized. Thomas Ricks (the most vocal accuser) notes that the number of officers identifying themselves as Republicans grew from one-third in 1976 to two-thirds in 1996<sup>24</sup>. Professor Holsti collected data from a series of Foreign Policy Leadership Project (FPLP) surveys. Below a graph displays the changes in party identification of military and civilian leaders<sup>25</sup>.

	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Republicans						
Military	33%	46%	53%	59%	61%	67%
Civilian	25%	28%	30%	29%	30%	34%
Democrats						
Military	12%	10%	12%	9%	6%	7%
Civilian	428	39%	40%	41%	42%	41%
Independents						
Military	46%	40%	29%	27%	26%	22%
Civilian	31%	30%	27%	27%	24%	22%
Other and none						
Military	9%	4%	5%	5%	6%	4 %
Civilians	2%	4%	3%	2%	3%	3%

This data, both men believe, displays a growing separation of military and civilian leadership. They contend that because more military personnel identify themselves as Republicans this proves that there is increase in politicization. The definition of "politicize" is to engage in or discuss politics or to make political. I am puzzled how the mere response to a survey of which party they would identify themselves with somehow points to an alarming increase in politicization of the officer corps. The change above in the number of officers claiming to identify with Democrats or Other and None is relatively minor. greatest change appears to be a probable shift from Independent to Republican identification. Because more officers respond as identifying with the Republican Party suddenly there should be a concern of a politicized officer corps? Mr. Ricks says, "Historically in this country and in other countries, politicization of the officer corps leads directly to military ineffectiveness"26. So in essence because the delta of numbers of officers that identify with the Republicans and the number of civilian who identify with the Democratic party has increased we are to be alert to a threatening rise in politicization in the ranks of the officer corps? I think not! Responses to surveys of party identification are not substantive enough to generate concern in the public that they have an officer corps

encroaching on the political infrastructure. In another twenty years the numbers are bound to change again.

There is, perhaps, some attention that military leaders should direct to a growing lack of appreciation for the expression of diverse political opinions by its members outside the confines of their official duties. Though I lack any empirical evidence, my own experience as 'Army brat' and career Army officer seems to point toward a decreasing willingness of officers in casual conversation to express what might be considered a 'liberal' view. A review of the factors would be useful at this point. As previously mentioned the military is essentially a conservative organization and there is evidence that significantly more military officers are identifying with the more conservative Republican Party. It is a fact that senior (and chronologically older) military leaders decide internal military policy. Since the U.S. military is an allvolunteer force we no longer have the influx of ideas that came from the entry and exit of a diverse population of conscripted citizens. There is of course no option for a civilian to enter at any level other than recruit or subaltern. Unlike civilian industry the military can not bring in mid-level executives from "outside the firm". That begs the question, how does the U.S. military prevent the occurrence of groupthink?

There are multiple reasons why the military should encourage the diversity of personal political opinions of its members. The military is engaged worldwide in efforts to assist the militaries of developing nations. The military cultures of these countries are not always reflective of the conservative tenor of U.S. military culture. Some are indeed stricter and some more permissive or liberal. A tolerance and understanding of opposing political views can assist our military mentor them appropriately. And if the future brings these countries to face us as adversaries in combat, an appreciation for their views might assist in "knowing our enemy".

The reality is that the military has always been, as Professor Huntington pointed out decades ago, a conservative-realistic organization. He believes that, "conservatism, not driven by its own logic to an inevitable conflict with military values, has no political-ideological pattern to impose on military institutions"<sup>27</sup>. Professor Deborah D. Avant responds directly to the criticism of the military as being far too conservative and hindering civilian decisions to use military force. She explains that current uncertain global conditions and the increase in the military being used in "unconventional" ways has led to a lack of consensus among civilian leadership. She believes that the conservatism of the military actually

makes sense in response to the lack of consensus among civilian leadership about the importance of low-level threats $^{28}$ .

I do not see great numbers of military officers actively engaging in or disrupting the conduct of national politics. I also do not see members of the American military banding together to defend the platforms and leaders of the Republican, Democratic or any other party. Men and women, however, continue to put their life on the line for American Constitutional values. These values, as articulated in NSC 68, are Freedom, Tolerance, Importance of the Individual, and Supremacy of Reason over Will. It is perhaps the great American Paradox: a highly professional and somewhat conservative military pledges to defend a Liberal Tradition that is generally hostile to armaments and standing armies<sup>29</sup>.

#### Values

"When we assumed the soldier we did not lay aside the citizen."

General George Washington

The U.S. military must be reflective of the society that it protects. The definition of the word "reflective" found in Webster's Dictionary is, "of, relating to, produced by, or resulting from reflection". The definition must be considered holistically. The U.S. military must be a product of the

American society and be able to relate to that society. It does not mean that the life of a soldier will be a duplicate of his civilian peer. The military must have unique rules to insure that the soldier and the unit can perform their assigned wartime mission. In the words of Marshal Maurice de Saxe: "Military discipline is the first matter that presents itself. It is the soul of armies. If it is not established with wisdom and maintained with unshakable resolution you will have no soldiers. Regiments and armies will be only contemptible, armed mobs, more dangerous to their own country than to the enemy"30. preceding quote calls on civilian and soldier to mutually respect the need for internal military discipline in the name of common national security. Life inside and outside of the ranks will be different and neither party should slight the other for this necessity.

It is dangerous business, however, when members of the military compare military value systems and the societal value system and judge American society inferior. Certainly Thomas Ricks vividly describes the contempt expressed by Marine recruits for the civilian society that they reared them<sup>31</sup>. Their fervor could merely be attributed to typical bravado from a cohort of recruits. One might ask how would you expect a "boot" to respond to the question, "Are military values higher, lower or the same standard as civilian societal standards". It

is a bit more disturbing to read retired Admiral Stanley
Arthur's words, "More and more, enlisted men and women as well
as officers are beginning to feel that they are special, better
than the society they serve. This is not healthy in an armed
force serving a democracy"<sup>32</sup>. It is particularly disturbing when
one considers Admiral Arthur's vantagepoint as former Commander
in Chief of all soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines in the
continental United States.

Thomas Ricks correctly cautions us that some individuals might even be proposing that a role of the military is to "fix the ills of society". He quotes retired Marine Colonel Michael Wyly as writing, "It is no longer enough for Marines to reflect the society they defend. They must lead it, not politically but culturally. For it is the culture we are defending"<sup>33</sup>. This type of inflammatory statement is in direct contravention to the military's constitutional duties. Members of the military pledge to defend the Constitution of the United States not some branch of contemporary culture. This type of self-righteous rhetoric is nothing short of ruinous.

The sacred trust between the American people and its military has allowed the military to repair and rebuild itself during hard times. It was therapeutic during the bleak days of the post-Vietnam period when it seemed the Army was unraveling. As a young Barry McCaffrey was reminded by his father, "Always

take the long view that the American people will help the Army right itself in the end"<sup>34</sup>. The military as servant to society should never consider it of such a pious stature that it would ever consider defying a civilian leadership that does not possess the same standard of values. Military values should not be considered higher but different than those of civilian society.

"Even where there is a necessity of the military power, within the land, which by the way but rarely happens, a wise and prudent people will always have a watchful and a jealous eye over it; for the maxims and rules of the Army, are essentially different from the genius of a free people, and the laws of a free government."

Samuel Adams<sup>35</sup>

# SECTION THREE- CONCLUSION- THIS CIVIL-MILITARY THING: HOW DO WE GET IT RIGHT AND KEEP IT RIGHT?

Having examined why civil-military relations is a subject worthy of attention and the challenges to maintaining a healthy civil-military relationship, it is time to consider how we can overcome these challenges.

There have been many credible options proposed in print that show promise as devices to assist us in maintaining healthy civil-military relations. What is missing, however, is a convenient theoretical model of civil-military relations geared toward the American soldier. I propose a model that represents

the synthesis of the study of models developed by leaders in academia and senior military leadership and my own experiences as an Army Officer and brother and son of a soldier. The three models I approached as my 'thesis' for my study were those of Professor Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz and Admiral Henry Eccles. My 'synthesis' appears below.

### A Soldier's Model for Civil-Military Relations

- 1. Don't underestimate your military experience. A successful military career is dependent upon the early formulation of a sound foundation of values. The military professional reinforces and defines those values in a wealth of experiences in both peacetime and combat. He is taught to quickly, and at times under fire, recognize the difference between right and wrong, moral and immoral and just and unjust. The ascendancy to a strategic level position does not somehow render the military leaders experiential judgement moot. There are no special rules in the civil-political arena that override basic core values.
- 2. Remember that policy drives war: get over it and move out. The U.S. military does not exist or fight wars for the sake of its own interests. We are one of many elements of power that achieve or maintain U.S. national interests. The optimal military solution may appear to military leaders to be best

suited for achieving the immediate military objectives. The civilian leader must seek the proper balance of military force of other resources to insure national interests are maintained. He is the one left on the ground to represent the United States after the military redeploys. As articulated in the U.S.M.C. manual, Warfighting, war must serve policy<sup>36</sup>.

3. The American people expect you to give your best military advice. You are a soldier first and foremost. You exist to insure that the military is prepared to fight and win the nation's wars. As General Colin Powell advised General McCaffrey, "Don't agonize over or try to decipher the political dimension of a crisis situation, but rather trust your principled military judgement"37. If you become mired in the political ramifications of a course of action, then who will give the civilian leadership that "best military advice" which the American people deserve. H.R. McMaster vividly details in his book Dereliction of Duty a lack of resolve and focus on the part of U.S. military leaders during the Vietnam conflict. Their failure to give "that best military advice" contributed to the disastrous Vietnam conflict resulting in a national disaster measured in failed American policy and the deaths of thousands of America's sons and daughters<sup>38</sup>.

- 4. Respect, embrace and (within reason) even practice the principles of the American Liberal Tradition that you pledge your life to defend. I can think of no better way to sum up this principle than to quote a speech given by the late Chief of Staff of the Army, General Creighton Abrams. "It's not bad to be idealistic. It's not bad to have high hopes. It's there for our flag, for all that's gone before, this whole thing has been built on two hundred years of sacrifice, two hundred years of faith, faith in an ideal." As Lewis Sorley explains of this passage, Abrams was describing to his audience of Army veterans that a volunteer army had to be an army like the country it represented one whose members had differences in origins and background, and yet shared crucial things such as devotion to their country and commitment to defending what it stood for<sup>39</sup>.
- 5. Obey your last lawful order. This principle assumes that the military leader can discern three things when receiving a mission. First, is the mission consistent with the principles of the U.S. Constitution? Secondly, is the civilian leader exercising his office consistent within the constitutional principles of civilian control? And finally, is the individual who brings the mission asking for advice for a proposed policy or delivering the final decision. If advice is what he seeks then gives him your best military advice. If it is execution that he requests, then do your best to accomplish the military

objectives or give way to another leader if your determine your competence lacking, or if the bounds of the mission violates your personal moral values and convictions.

6.Serve as an Advocate for your soldiers in peace and under fire. Of course your soldiers expect you to insure that they are not placed unnecessarily in harm's way. So also do the American people for it is their sons and daughters who serve in the ranks of the military. The stewardship of the care and leadership of the citizens who become the recruits is nothing less than sacred. It is in this role that the people and the military share their closest bond. The mothers and fathers of this country demand that their military leaders perform this responsibility expertly.

Likewise the civilian leadership expects military leaders to perform this advocate's role for tangible and intangible reasons. The American public has been vocal about their disdain for large number of casualties. The elected and appointed civilian officials well know the sting of public ire that one can face in the press or election hall when the American military suffers excessive casualties. The civilian leader relies on the feedback that comes from the close personal relationship of military leader and his soldiers. They expect that any risk assessment by a military leader will include a careful examination of the cost of personal injury or loss of

life. Only the leader in uniform has the privilege of enjoying this quintessential expression of public trust- - the direct maintenance of the well being of the lives of our nations modern day patriots.

Regardless of the choice of model of civil-military relations, it is important for military and civilian leaders to each come a personal appreciation for the maintenance of healthy civil-military relations. Furthermore they be able to articulate this for those subordinates that represent the future leadership. In so doing they will insure the maintenance of the principles of civilian control embodied in the U.S.

Constitution. They will also allow the military to face an uncertain full of the challenges of difficult peace operations, assistance to the militaries of developing countries worldwide and emergency augmentation of U.S. civilian agencies on the home front.

Word count= 5931

#### ENDNOTES

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- <sup>3</sup> Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Origins of the Coup of 2012," Parameters (Winter 1992-1993): 2-15.
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- <sup>5</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, <u>The Soldier and the State</u> (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1957), vii <sup>6</sup> Ibid., 3.
- <sup>7</sup> The White House, <u>A National Security Strategy for a New Century, October 1998</u> (Washington D.C.) 1-2.
  - <sup>8</sup> Ibid., 21.
  - <sup>9</sup> Ibid., 13.
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  - <sup>11</sup> Dunlap, 4.
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